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Abstract 
This study undertook a comparison of the changes to corporate governance (CG) practices, 
based on the UAE CG codes, for three different periods of time between 2006 to 2007, 2009 
to 2010 and 2013 to 2014. An ordinary least squares model, along with analysis of variance 
testing, was employed to compare this. The study sample included 47 listed firms in the UAE. 
The changes made to the CG code during the study period affected the audit and board 
committee characteristics. The results show that the second CG code change had the most 
significant effect on board meetings, board members’ education, board members’ experience, 
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audit committee meetings and audit committee members’ education impact on the financial 
performance of UAE listed firms. The potential policy implications arising from the study 
centre on ensuring greater firm compliance to meet the expectations of the regulatory body, 
as mandated in the CG code. 
Keywords: CG codes, UAE, Board characteristics, Audit characteristics, Firm performance 
1. Introduction 
The rapid nature of the UAE’s economic growth rate has made the UAE one of the most 
developed countries in the Middle East which, from a per capita perspective, is among the top 
30 economies in the world (Trading Economics 2017). Despite this rapid growth and high 
levels of foreign investment, the regulatory and legal framework in the UAE has, as yet, 
failed to keep up with these changes. Thus, to address what has been recognised as lax 
governance practice laws, or poor corporate governance (CG), the UAE government in 2007 
established the first CG code through Decision No. R/32 of 2007, which presented the 
primary regulatory framework for the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority 
(ESCA).  
Although this was a positive step towards tightening governance and transparency issues, 
Aljifri and Moustafa (2007) felt that the UAE first CG code could be improved to render it 
more suitable for the UAE business environment. Moreover, a report by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007) stated that the first UAE CG code was weak and required 
improvement such as the incorporation of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
These criticisms, along with the global financial crisis (GFC), acted as a catalyst for the UAE 
to institute a second CG code in 2009 via the Ministerial Resolution No. 518 of 2009. Unlike 
the first CG code, the second CG code became mandatory for all listed companies, which 
were required to comply with the code by 30 April 2010 (Ministerial Resolution No. 518 of 
2009). 
The UAE became a better equipped to mitigate corruption following the advent of these CG 
codes. This was reflected in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which 
saw the UAE move from the position of thirty-first cleanest country in terms of perceived 
corruption to twenty-third in 2015 (Andrew 2015). The shift to a more transparent and 
regulated financial environment via the implementation of CG codes also had direct effects 
on board and audit committee characteristics.  
Consequently, the main objective of this study is to examine the influence of the changes to 
the CG codes on the financial performance of listed companies in the UAE via the prism of 
audit and board committee characteristics. To empirically examine this relationship the 
present study employed data on 47 listed companies on the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) 
and Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX). An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
model and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were then employed to analyse three-time periods 
to enable a comparative analysis of the effect of changes to the CG code and their effect on 
financial performance. The three-time periods are: 
 Period 1: The period prior to the adoption of the first CG code: 2006 to 2007; 
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 Period 2: The period two years after adoption of the first CG code: 2009 to 2010; 
 Period 3: The period three years after adoption of the second CG code: 2013 to 2014. 
Our empirical results show, the two amendments made to the corporate governance code 
during the study period affected the audit and board committee characteristics, as intended by 
these amendments. Of these amendments, the second amendment had the most significant 
effect on board meetings, board members’ education, board members’ experience, audit 
committee meetings and audit committee members’ education.  
Our study contributes to the CG literature by adding to the limited studies on CG in 
developing countries, and specifically in the UAE, has resulted in a significant gap between 
foundation theories and practical applicability. Specifically, the adoption of UAE CG codes 
and their effect on financial performance has not been addressed in the literature. This study 
will fill this knowledge gap by examining this relationship. The remainder of this paper is 
organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the UAE CG codes. Section 3 describes the research 
design. Section 4 presents results and discusses findings. Section 5 draws conclusions, 
implications and enters recommendations for further research. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 CG in the UAE 
The 1984 UAE Corporations Act incorporates articles that govern corporation management 
processes. This Act has formed rules (from Article 95 to 118) related to the board of directors’ 
selection, composition, duties and management processes (Federal Law No. 8, 1984). For 
instance, Article 95 sets minimum and maximum number of directors while Articles 111 to 
118 focus on the duties of a chairperson and board of directors (Federal Law No. 8, 1984). In 
addition, with respect to auditors, all corporations in the UAE are required to maintain proper 
financial records, including minimum accounting reports, financial statements, statement of 
profit and notes to these accounts. According to the Act, the annual audited accounts must be 
presented before shareholders at an annual general meeting (Federal Law No. 8, 1984). 
However, despite the 1984 Corporations Act, the laws surrounding CG behaviour of firms 
was still seen as lacking. Consequently, in 2006 the Hawkamah Institute for Corporate 
Governance was established to help strengthen CG practices in the UAE.  
2.2 UAE CG Codes 
The first CG code in the UAE was published in 2007through Decision No. R/32 of 2007, 
which was regulated by ESCA until 2010. This code identified the rules and procedures for 
making decisions in corporate relationships. It further clarified the shareholders’ rights, 
composition of the board of directors and the audit committee, election of board of directors, 
board of directors’ meetings and audit committee meetings. It also identified tasks and duties 
for the board of directors, audit committee and chairperson of the board of directors. The CG 
code provided for the company’s articles of association to determine the size of the board and 
audit committee, and the remuneration of the directors of the board (ESCA 2007). 
Some analysts, however, asserted that the provisions of the do not go far enough to address 
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the prevailing CG issues (Ahmad 2010). Acknowledging this, the government issued a 
second code post-GFC to overcome the perceived gaps in the first code. Thus, in 2009, the 
Ministry of Economy of the UAE published Ministerial Resolution No. 518 of 2009, which is 
referred to as the second CG code. This code replaced the old code and enhanced CG rules 
and discipline standards for UAE public joint stock companies (PJSC) and institutions whose 
securities are listed on the market.  In 2010, the CG code became mandatory for all listed 
companies, and compliance was required by 30 April 2010. Ministerial Reregulation No. 518 
reflects the continuing efforts of the government to align the regulation of the investment 
markets in the UAE with those of the leading international financial markets (Ahmad 2010). 
The second CG code is mandatory for all listed companies. The change from voluntary to 
mandatory meant that UAE listed firms were now compelled to adopt the CG codes. Hence, 
even if a CG code did not change in content from the first CG code to the second CG code 
(e.g., board of directors composition), the mandatory nature of the second CG code meant 
that it had the ability to affect the firm financial performance of UAE listed companies.  
This second CG code established good standards of CG and was largely based on 
international standards. Both the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and Dubai Financial 
Market (DFM) are licensed and regulated by the ESCA. The UAE government established 
the ESCA on 1 February 2000, pursuant to Federal Law No. 4 of 2000, under the leadership 
of the Minister of Economy and Commerce. Its function was to strength the legislative 
structure through issuing regulations and instructions that ensure the development of the 
organisational framework of UAE listed companies. It also regulates and develops the 
primary and secondary markets, monitors the market and promotes a safe and favourable 
environment for investors (ESCA 2000). According to Steven and Carla (2010), the two UAE 
CG codes have focused on making further improvements to CG rules.  
The study period for the present research covers the first CG code (2007) and the second CG 
code (2010). Table 1 below provides a comparison of the first and second CG codes as they 
relate to board and audit committee characteristics chosen for the study, based on prior 
studies. They are: board size (Almatari et al. 2014b; Johl et al. 2015; Rouf 2011); board 
independent directors (Dabor et al. 2015; Khan and Awan 2012; Yasser et al. 2011); board 
meetings (Ntim & Oseit 2011; Hsu & Petchsakulwong 2010; Johl et al. 2015); board 
members’ experience (Zhu & Shen 2016; Johl et al. 2015; Hsu 2010); board members’ 
education (Almatari et al. 2013; Vo & Phan 2013; Hsu 2010); audit committee size (Hamdan 
et al. 2013; Aldamen et al. 2012; Ibrahim et al. 2009); audit committee independent members 
(Yasser et al. 2011; Almatari et al. 2014b; Ghabayen 2012); audit committee meetings 
(Hamdan et al. 2013; Alqatamin 2018; Almatari et al. 2014b); and audit committee members’ 
education (Aldamen et al. 2012; Almatari et al. 2014a; Hamid & Aziz 2012).  
Table 1. Comparison of first and second codes of CG in the UAE 
CG Characteristics  First CG Code (2007) 
(Voluntary) 
Second CG Code (2010) (Mandatory) 
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Board size The company’s articles of 
association can determine the 
number on the board of directors. 
At least three members and a maximum 
of 15 members. 
Board independent directors  At least one-third of directors must 
be independent directors. 
The board must comprise at least 
one-third independent directors. 
Board meetings Meetings must be held at least 
once every two months. 
The board meeting should be set once or 
more every two months. 
Board members’ experience Directors must have experience 
and technical skills in the best 
interests of the company. 
Board directors must be trained to 
understand the company’s policies, 
organisational structure and business, as 
well as their duties under the law. 
Board members’ education Not stated. Board members should have sufficient 
qualifications, skills and experience to 
conduct their duties.  




Not stated. The audit committee must comprise one 
independent member.  
Audit committee meetings The audit committee should meet 
once or more every three months 
or whenever necessary. 
The audit committee should meet at 
least once every three months. 
Audit committee members’ 
education 
The audit committee should have 
members with financial and 
accounting backgrounds. 
The audit committee must have at least 
one member with a financial 
qualification or an expert in accounting 
and financial affairs. 
The primary contribution of the present research is a comparative analysis to examine the 
extent to which both CG codes have affected the financial performance of UAE listed 
companies 
3. Data and Research Methods 
3.1 Data 
This study used secondary data obtained from different online sources: DFM, ADX, Mint 
Global, Orbis—Bureau van Dijk, DataStream, UAE listed firms’ website and ESCA (see 
Appendix 1). Data related to firm financial performance were obtained from financial 
statements, such as balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements provided in 
the respective annual reports. 
The sample initially consisted of all UAE firms listed on the DFM and ADX as of July 2014 
and the selection of companies was determined by the availability of data for each of the 
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three time periods. In total, there were 127 listed companies at that time, with 59 listed 
companies on the DFM and 68 listed companies on the ADX for the overall study period 
2006-2007; 2009-2010; 2013-2014. The years between these periods are deemed to be 
transition periods and are subsequently not included in the estimation models. The DFM and 
ADX markets were chosen because companies on these markets are more likely to attract and 
employ skilled and competent individuals on the boards of directors and audit committees. 
The listed companies selected in this study had to meet three criteria: (i) provide information 
about board and audit committee characteristics for the study period; (ii) provide financial 
performance information; and (iii) possess complete data for the study period. Based on these 
criteria, the number of firms was reduced to 61 because some listed firms did not have 
information available on the key explanatory variables identified in this study, while other 
firms did not have any information available via published accessible sites. Another 14 
companies were omitted from the study sample because they contained outliers (Hair et al., 
2010). As a result, the present study’s final sample comprised 47 listed firms and 282 total 
observations. 
The study estimated two equations: one for each of the financial performance variables, ROA 
and ROE. The estimated OLS regression is in the form: 
FPi = α + β1BSi + β2 BIND + β3BMi + β4BMEDi + β5BMEXi + β6ACSi + β7ACINDi 
         +β8ACMi + β9ACEDi + β10FAi + β11 LEVi + β12FSi + ei                   (1) 
where: 
BS = board size 
BIND = board independent directors 
BM = board meetings 
BMED = board members’ education 
BMEX = board members’ experience 
ACS = audit committee size 
ACIND = audit committee independent members 
ACM = audit committee meetings 
ACED = audit committee members’ education 
FA = firm age 
LEV = leverage 
FS = firm size 
FP = financial performance, which includes ROA and ROE. 
The estimation model controlled for firm age (FA), leverage (LEV) and firm size (FS) an 
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approach widely used in CG studies. The models were estimated via OLS and via one-way 
ANOVA along with post-hoc tests. 
4. Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 below provides the descriptive statistics on the study variables. The mean size of 
boards in the sample was 7.70, ranging from five to 15 members of which, on average, 
71.24% were independent directors. This observation is consistent with the recommendations 
of the first and second UAE CG codes.  On the average the companies had about six 
meetings in a year, ranging from a minimum of one meeting to a maximum of 16 meetings 
per year. In this study, the board members’ education ranged from a minimum of 36% to a 
maximum of 100%, with an average of 74.36% of board members holding a foreign degree 
from universities in developed countries. The mean board members’ experience in the sample 
was 21 years, with a range from a minimum of seven years to a maximum of 39 years of 
experience for board members. The mean audit committee size in the sample comprised 3.32 
committee members, ranging from a minimum of two members to a maximum of seven 
members.  
The audit committee size was not stated in the first CG code in the UAE, while the second 
code stated that the audit committee should have at least three members. In addition, on 
average, 81.13% of audit committee members were independent, with a minimum of 20% 
and a maximum of 100%. Further, the mean number of audit committee meetings was 4.70, 
ranging from a minimum of two meetings to a maximum of 12 meetings per year. The audit 
committee members’ education ranged from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 100% of 
audit committee members holding a degree in a financial discipline. On average, 41.80% of 
members held a financial degree. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of board and audit committee characteristics 
Variable N Abbr. Minimum Maximum Mean 
Board size 282 BS 5 15 7.70 
Board independent directors 282 BIND 33% 100% 71.24% 
Board meetings (per year) 282 BM 1 16 6.15 
Board members’ education 282 BMED 36% 100% 74.36% 
Board members’ experience (years) 282 BMEX 7 39 21.19 
Audit committee size 282 ACS 2 7 3.32 
Audit committee independent 
members 
282 ACIND 20% 100% 81.13% 
Audit committee meetings (per year) 282 ACM 2 12 4.70 
Audit committee members’ education 282 ACED 0 100% 41.80% 
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4.2 Correlation Matrix  
Table 3 below presents the correlation coefficients for the variable set. Overall, the 
correlations are low with no indication of strong correlations as per the criteria of 0.80 
(Grewal, Cote & Baumgartner 2004; Shearer & Clark 2016). 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
  BS BIND BM BMED BMEX ACS ACIND ACM ACED ROA ROE LV FA 
BS 1 
            
BIND 0.096 1 
           
BM 0.010 0.199** 1 
          
BMED ˗0.017 0.041 0.010 1 
         
BMEX 0.310** -0.086 00.102 0.197** 1 
        
ACS 0.418** 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.172** 1 
       
ACIND 0.022 0.209** 0.079 0.047 0.069 0.090 1 
      
ACM 0.318** 0.181** 0.350** 0.173** 0.265** 0.252** 0.114 1 
     
ACED ˗0.247** 0.010 0.092 -0.057 0.082 -0.207** 0.204** -0.050 1 
    
ROA 0.082 -0.022 0.070 -0.109 0.138* 0.037 0.057 0.040 .008 1 
   
ROE 0.019 0.070 0.010 0.043 -0.076 0.033 0.032 0.103 -.036 0.452** 1   
LEV  -0.058 0.398** 0.250** 0.014 0.079 0.187** 0.109 0.078 -0.052 -0.082 0.025 1 
 
FA 0.168** 0.078 0.033 0.103 0.067 0.078 -0.054 -0.015 -.122* -0.052 0.001* 0.070 1 
FS  0.020 0.016 0.277** 0.040 0.003 -0.176** 0.060 0.301** .216** -0.041 0.069 0.269** -0.104 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
4.3 Collinearity  
Table 4 shows the results of the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance for the 
independent and control variables in the model. A tolerance (1/VIF) value of less than 0.20 
and a VIF value of greater than 10 indicates the presence of collinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell 
2007). The results suggest that all variables in the regression model have VIF factor scores 
below the benchmark of 10 and tolerance values greater than 0.20, which indicates the 
absence of multicollinearity. 
Table 4. Results for VIF and tolerance 
Variable VIF Tolerance (1/VIF) 
Board size (BS) 1.53 0.650 
Board independent directors (BIND) 1.52 0.655 
Board meetings (BM) 1.30 0.764 
Board members’ education (BMED) 1.10 0.902 
Board members’ experience (BMEX) 1.31 0.760 
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Audit committee size (ACS) 1.44 0.693 
Audit committee independent members (ACIND) 1.25 0.795 
Audit committee meeting (ACM) 1.65 0.603 
Audit committee members’ education (ACED) 1.24 0.802 
Firm age (FA) 1.08 0.662 
Leverage (LEV) 1.51 0.921 
Firm size (FS) 1.48 0.673 
4.4 Effects of Return on Assets Model 
The results of the ROA model are given in Table 5 below. The estimates for the three 
sub-periods models are significant (p-value < 0.001). The R
2
 indicates that the predictors are 
able to explain 47.8% of variation in firm financial performance for Period 1, 49.5% for 
Period 2 and 49.9% for Period 3. The results demonstrate that the OLS model fits the study 
data for the three sub-periods. 
Table 5. ROA Models using OLS for three sub-periods—Period 1 (2006–2007), Period 2 
(2009–2010) and Period 3 (2013–2014) 






Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
(Constant) ˗2.970 0.104 0.986 0.452 1.460 0.328 
BS 0.100 0.248 0.163 0.009 ˗0.059 0.238 
BIND 0.003 0.767 0.006 0.354 0.001 0.890 
BM 0.233 0.113 0.266 0.007 0.021 0.750 
BMED 0.027 0.005 ˗0.002 0.732 ˗0.005 0.522 
BMEX 0.023 0.525 ˗0.055 0.027 ˗0.024 0.270 
ACS 0.067 0.777 ˗0.007 0.970 0.251 0.247 
ACIND 0.035 < 0.001 0.025 < 0.001 0.042 < 0.001 
ACM ˗0.001 0.997 0.055 0.530 0.176 0.005 
ACED 0.016 0.015 0.005 0.371 0.005 0.153 
LEV 0.001 0.940 ˗0.001 0.745 0.004 0.447 
FA 0.008 0.579 0.030 0.005 0.003 0.788 
FS 0.030 0.884 ˗0.313 0.040 ˗0.030 0.829 
R-squared 0.478  0.495  0.499  
F-statistic 5.720  6.440  6.720  
p-value  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  
Note: BS = board size, BIND = board independent directors, BM = board meetings, BMED 
= board members’ education, BMEX = board members’ experience, ACS = audit committee 
size, ACIND = audit committee independent members, ACM = audit committee meeting, 
ACED = audit committee members’ education, LEV = leverage, FA = firm age, FS = firm 
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size. 
The results for board characteristics show no relationship between ROA and board size in 
Periods 1 and 3; however, in Period 2 the relationship is significant and positive. The 
association between ROA and both board independent directors and board meetings is 
positive for all three periods; however, the association between ROA and board meetings is 
significant only for e Period 2. The relationship between ROA and board members’ education 
in Period 1 is significant and positive, while Periods 2 and 3 show no significant relationship. 
Finally, there is no significant association between ROA and board members’ experience for 
Periods 1 and 3, while it is significant and negative for Period 2. 
The results for the audit committee characteristics and ROA demonstrated no significant 
relationship between ROA and audit committee size. With respect to audit committee 
independent members it was demonstrated to have a significant and positive effect on ROA 
for all three periods. The association between ROA and audit committee meetings was also 
significant and positive but only for Period 3, while audit committee members’ education 
displayed a significant and positive effect on ROA for Period 1 only.  
4.5 Effects of Return on Equity Model 
The results of the ROE model are given in Table 6 below. The estimates for the three 
sub-periods are significant (p-value < 0.001). The R
2
 indicates that the predictors are able to 
explain 50.2% of variation in firm financial performance for Period 1, 41.7% for Period 2 and 
48.9% for Period 3. The results demonstrate that the OLS model fits the study data for three 
sub-periods. 
Table 6. ROE Models using OLS for three sub-periods—Period 1(2006–2007), Period 2 
(2009–2010) and Period 3 (2013–2014) 






Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
(Constant) 0.841 0.688 1.130 0.499 1.590 0.390 
BS 0.092 0.358 0.180 0.024 0.046 0.457 
BIND ˗0.035 0.001 ˗0.005 0.505 ˗0.013 0.060 
BM 0.340 0.046 0.380 0.003 0.116 0.166 
BMED 0.007 0.504 ˗0.012 0.181 ˗0.003 0.730 
BMEX ˗0.035 0.409 ˗0.107 0.001 ˗0.029 0.270 
ACS ˗0.523 0.058 ˗0.038 0.874 0.042 0.874 
ACIND 0.010 0.239 0.001 0.988 0.015 0.049 
ACM 0.344 0.068 0.272 0.016 0.407 < 0.001 
ACED 0.039 < 0.001 0.030 < 0.001 0.020 < 0.001 
LEV 0.011 0.184 0.003 0.569 0.004 0.517 
FA ˗0.007 0.648 0.025 0.073 ˗0.010 0.425 
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FS 0.210 0.370 ˗0.282 0.147 0.157 0.365 
R-squared 0.502  0.417  0.489  
F-test (ANOVA) 6.300  4.710  6.460  
p-value (F-test) < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  
Note: Refer to note in Table 5 for full variable names. 
The results for board characteristics and ROE show no significant relationship between ROE 
and board size for Periods 1 and 3; however, Period 2 is significant and positive. The 
association between ROE and board independent directors is negative for all periods, with 
Periods 1 and 3 being significant. For board meetings, there is a significant and positive 
relationship for Periods 1 and 2, while board members’ education displays no significant 
relationships for all three periods. The association between ROE and board members’ 
experience is negative for all periods, but is only significant for Period 2. 
In regard to the relationship between audit committee characteristics and ROE, the result 
shows a significant negative relationship between ROE and audit committee size for Period 1, 
while the association between ROE and audit committee independent members is significant 
and positive for Period 3. For the variables audit committee meeting and audit committee 
members’ education, there is a significant and positive effect on ROE for all three periods. 
In this study, comparisons of the mean values of board and audit committee characteristics 
and the financial performance of the UAE listed companies are tested to determine any 
significant changes in CG practices during the three selected periods. Specifically, one-way 
ANOVA and multiple comparison analysis (Tukey’s HSD) are conducted to examine the 
difference between the groups by classifying the periods into three groups in accordance with 
the changes in UAE CG codes. A one-way ANOVA is employed to compare the difference 
between the means of the dependent and independent variables in the three periods. Table 7 
shows the results. 
Table 7. ANOVA Test 
  Sum of Squares Mean Square F p-value 
BS Between groups 6.05 3.025 0.650 0.523 
BIND Between groups 33.792 16.896 0.046 0.955 
BM Between groups 50.764 25.382 14.21 < 0.001 
BMED Between groups 7,530.52 3765.2 18.10 < 0.001 
BMEX Between groups 1,281.15 640.57 29.59 < 0.001 
ACS Between groups 0.135 0.067 0.185 0.831 
ACIND  Between groups 87.633 43.817 0.110 0.896 
ACM Between groups 44.053 22.026 10.25 < 0.001 
ACED Between groups 6,372.04 3186.0 5.434 0.005 
ROA Between groups 11.428 5.714 3.459 0.033 
ROE Between groups 225.464 112.73 48.69 < 0.001 
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Note: Refer to note in Table 5 for full variable names. 
Table 8. Multiple comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) 





BS Period 2 Period 1 0.043 0.315 0.990 
Period 3 Period 1 0.330 0.315 0.547 
Period 2 0.287 0.315 0.633 
BIND Period 2 Period 1 ˗0.058 2.785 0.999 
Period 3 Period 1 0.703 2.785 0.966 
Period 2 0.762 2.785 0.960 
BM Period 2 Period 1 0.313 0.198 0.256 
Period 3 Period 1 1.026
**
 0.198 < 0.001 
Period 2 0.713
**
 0.195 < 0.001 
BMED Period 2 Period 1 4.536 2.103 0.081 
Period 3 Period 1 12.500
**
 2.103 < 0.001 
Period 2 7.965
**
 2.103 < 0.001 
BMEX Period 2 Period 1 2.546
**
 0.679 < 0.001 
Period 3 Period 1 5.220
**
 0.679 < 0.001 
Period 2 2.675
**
 0.679 < 0.001 
ACS Period 2 Period 1 0.032 0.088 0.930 
Period 3 Period 1 0.053 0.088 0.818 
Period 2 0.021 0.088 0.968 
ACIND Period 2 Period 1 ˗0.218 2.907 0.997 
Period 3 Period 1 ˗1.276 2.907 0.899 
Period 2 ˗1.057 2.907 0.930 
ACM Period 2 Period 1 0.493 0.215 0.058 
Period 3 Period 1 0.968
**
 0.214 < 0.001 
Period 2 0.475 0.215 0.071 
ACED Period 2 Period 1 ˗0.217 3.531 0.998 
Period 3 Period 1 9.973
*
 3.531 0.014 
Period 2 10.190
*
 3.531 0.012 
ROA Period 2 Period 1 ˗0.247 0.190 0.397 
Period 3 Period 1 0.245 0.190 0.404 
Period 2 0.493
*
 0.187 0.024 
ROE Period 2 Period 1 ˗0.034 0.225 0.987 
Period 3 Period 1 1.889
**
 0.225 < 0.001 
Period 2 1.923
**
 0.221 < 0.001 
Note: Refer to note in Table 5 for full variable names; ** Mean difference is significant at the 
0.01 level; * Mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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There were significant differences between the mean values of the following independent 
variables: board meetings, board members’ education, board members’ experience, audit 
committee meetings and audit committee members’ education. In addition, all three firm 
financial performance measures showed significant differences within their respective means 
over the three identified periods. Thus, from an overall perspective, changes to the CG codes 
seem to have affected the CG characteristics and financial performance of UAE listed firms. 
However, as stated previously, the ANOVA test does not indicate which pairs of means are 
significantly different. To identify this, a post hoc Tukey test is performed and the results are 
given in Table 8. 
From an overall perspective, the post hoc tests on the ANOVA indicated that the adoption of 
CG codes did result in a significant positive change to board meetings, board members’ 
education, board members’ experience, audit committee meetings and audit committee 
members’ education, while no significant changes were observed in board size, board 
independent directors, audit committee size and audit committee independent members.  
With respect to the statistically significant variables, board meetings demonstrated a 
significant difference of means for Period 3, which encompasses the second CG code. The 
recommendations in the first and second CG codes are fairly similar, as both expect meetings 
to be held at least once every two months. Thus, the results suggest that firms in the sample 
data were not adhering to the first CG code, and that the move to make the second CG code 
mandatory had the effect of causing significantly more firms to follow the stipulation.  
There are statistically significant differences in the level of board members’ education, which 
imply that there was a significant difference in the number of directors who studied in foreign 
developed countries between the sub-periods. Hence, the change to the governance rules 
caused significant changes to board members’ education within the listed companies.  
The Tukey post hoc test results for board members’ experience show statistically significant 
differences between means for all sub-periods. The study results suggest that the second CG 
code emphasis on improving experience by having board members undertake training to 
better understand company policies, structure and duties under law has resulted in a positive 
effect among UAE listed firms.  
With respect to audit committee meetings, the Tukey test showed statistically significant 
differences over the selected periods was significant. Hence, although the wording of this 
specific CG code did not change much, the fact that the first CG code was voluntary, while 
the second CG code was mandatory, suggests that this could be the reason for the significant 
change that resulted in increased audit committee meetings among the UAE listed companies. 
A Tukey post hoc test revealed statistically significant differences between the audit 
committee members’ education periods due to the onset of the second CG code. Specifically, 
it resulted in a significant difference in the ratio of number of audit committee members 
holding a degree in a financial discipline to the total members in the committee over the 
selected periods.  
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Firm financial performance comprises two measures: ROA and ROE. The Tukey post hoc 
test revealed differences in the financial parameters across the selected periods. The results 
showed statistically significant findings for ROA and ROE Q after the adoption of the second 
CG code. Specifically, there was a significant increase in ROA in Period 3 compared with 
Period 2, while ROE experienced a significant increase in Period 3 compared with Periods 1 
and 2. The significant results for both firm financial performance measures suggests that 
changes to the second CG code had a positive effect on the financial performance of UAE 
listed companies. 
To further understand this impact, a comparative analyses was employed to investigate the 
changes occurring in the relationship between board and audit committee characteristics and 
firm financial performance between the periods of 2006 to 2007, 2009 to 2010 and 2013 to 
2014 as measured by ROA and ROE. The results are in Table 9 below. 
The results show that changes to the UAE CG codes had a statistically significant impact on 
the relationship between board size and firm financial performance for both ROA and ROE. 
Specifically, ROA changed to significant after the first CG code adoption (Period 2) and to 
negative and insignificant after the adoption of the second CG code (Period 3). ROE changed 
to significant after the first CG code (Period 2) and then to insignificant after the second CG 
code (Period 3). This suggests that there was no significant effect on board size by changing 
the UAE CG codes from voluntary to mandatory. 
Table 9. Comparative analyses three sub-periods—Period 1(2006–2007), Period 2 (2009–
2010) and Period 3 (2013–2014) 
Board and Audit Committee Variables  ROA ROE 
BS Period 1 Pos, Insig Pos, Insig 
BS Period 2 Pos, Sig Pos, Sig 
BS Period 3 Neg, Insig Pos, Insig 
BIND Period 1 Pos, Insig Neg, Sig 
BIND Period 2 Pos, Insig Neg, Insig 
BIND Period 3 Pos, Insig Neg, Sig 
BM Period 1 Pos, Insig Pos, Sig 
BM Period 2 Pos, Sig Pos, Sig 
BM Period 3 Pos, Insig Pos, Insig 
BMED Period 1 Pos, Sig Pos, Insig 
BMED Period 2 Neg, Insig Neg, Insig 
BMED Period 3 Neg, Insig Neg, Insig 
BMEX Period 1 Pos, Insig Neg, Insig 
BMEX Period 2 Neg, Sig Neg, Sig 
BMEX Period 3 Neg, Sig Neg, Insig 
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ACS Period 1 Pos, Insig Neg, Sig 
ACS Period 2 Neg, Insig Neg, Insig 
ACS Period 3 Pos, Insig Neg, Insig 
ACIND Period 1 Pos, Sig Pos, Insig 
ACIND Period 2 Pos, Sig Pos, Insig 
ACIND Period 3 Pos, Sig Pos, Sig 
ACM Period 1 Neg, Insig  Pos, Sig  
ACM Period 2 Pos, Insig Pos, Sig 
ACM Period 3 Pos, Sig Pos, Sig 
ACED Period 1 Pos, Sig Pos, Sig 
ACED Period 2 Pos, Insig Pos, Sig 
ACED Period 3 Pos, Insig Pos, Sig 
Note: Refer to note in Table 5 for full variable names; Pos = positive, Neg = negative, Sig = 
significant, Insig = insignificant, Period 1 = 2006-2007, Period 2 = 2009-2010, Period 3 = 
2013-2014. 
With respect to board meetings, the change in UAE CG codes had a positive impact on firm 
financial performance for both models. A possible reason for this could be the number of the 
meetings prescribed under the new codes enabling the board to be more effective in providing 
timely governance directions to the management and reduce the unproductive activities. As 
Table 1 showed, both the first and second UAE CG codes stated that board meetings should 
be set once or more every two months; however, there was no maximum limit recommended 
by the codes. As Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) demonstrated, 
frequent meetings can lead to resources being channelled towards less productive activities 
and thereby affecting firm financial performance. 
For board members’ education and firm financial performance, the relationship changed from 
significant and positive in the first period (pre CG code 1) to insignificant and negative in the 
second and third periods for ROA and remained insignificant throughout for ROE. Although 
board members’ education is an important resource for the UAE to improve its financial 
performance—and is typically proxied via education qualification to equate to managerial 
quality—other factors might also need to be considered, such as managerial skills, networks 
and other skills obtained outside of an educational qualification. This could act as a basis for 
future studies. 
The result for the relationship between board members’ experience and firm financial 
performance for ROA saw firm financial performance became significant and negative for 
both periods 2 and 3 as opposed to positive and insignificant in period 1. While for ROE, all 
three periods had a negative direction but it was significant for period 2. The Tukey multiple 
comparisons test indicated that board members’ experience increased after adopting the first 
and second UAE CG codes. 
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In light of the results from the present research, the UAE CG code should specify the 
required competencies of directors. According to Kikhia (2014), board members who have 
financial expertise enhance the quality of oversight by the board. This enhanced oversight 
may substitute increased auditor effort and reduce the auditor’s assessment of controlled risk, 
thereby resulting in improved firm financial performance. 
The result of the OLS test showed that the CG codes appear to have affected the relationship 
between audit committee meeting and firm financial performance as measured by ROA but 
remain unchanged for ROE. Although the CG code suggested that the audit committee should 
meet at least once every three months, some firms did not strictly comply with this law, 
which could negatively affect the firm financial performance (see Table 1). This is a possible 
reason for the changes in the relationship between audit committee meetings and firm 
financial performance. 
With respect to the relationship between audit committee members’ education and firm 
financial performance, the result shows that the changes to the UAE CG rule had an 
insignificant effect on the relationship between audit committee members’ education and firm 
financial performance for the ROA model (e.g., Periods 2 and 3). The relationship with ROE 
remained unchanged for all three periods. The Tukey test revealed a significant difference 
period 3 which indicated a greater number of audit committee members holding a degree in a 
financial discipline to the total members in the committee, compared with the other two 
periods. Hence, the changes to the governance rules in 2010 caused significant changes to 
committee members’ education within the listed UAE companies. Having audit committee 
members with financial qualifications is very important for UAE listed companies. However, 
this study found that audit committee members can come from a wide variety of backgrounds 
and may not have sufficient financial or accounting knowledge, which could negatively affect 
firm financial performance.  
Although some variables remained unchanged during the changes to the UAE CG codes, the 
majority of them did change, which affected firm financial performance. This study reached 
the conclusion that a higher level of compliance with CG codes will improve performance, as 
measured by various instruments. It is also notable that effective boards and audit committees 
can compensate for shortfalls in compliance, at least to some extent.  
5. Conclusions and Implications 
The study sought to identify the changes in the relationship between board and audit 
committee characteristics and firm financial performance due to changes in the CG codes. 
According to the results of the OLS regression, the changes to the UAE CG codes affected 
the relationship between board and audit committee characteristics and firm financial 
performance. In addition to the OLS regression, a one-way ANOVA with Tukey post hoc 
tests provided further specific information regarding how the changes to each variable, based 
on changes to the CG codes, affected the relationship between board and audit committee 
characteristics and firm financial performance.  
Specifically, the ANOVA test showed that, from an overall perspective, changes to the CG 
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codes resulted in a positive and significant increase on the financial performance of listed 
companies in the UAE as measured by ROA and ROE. Post hoc tests on the ANOVA 
indicated that the adoption of CG codes did result in a significant positive change to board 
meetings, board members’ education, board members’ experience, audit committee meetings 
and audit committee members’ education, while board size, board composition, audit 
committee size and audit committee composition did not change.  
This study tested the effect of the first and second CG codes on financial performance of 
UAE listed companies. Consequently, the present research provided new insights into the 
impact that the changes to CG codes had on the financial performance of UAE listed firms. 
Some implications from the results suggest that UAE listed firms need to improve the quality 
of CG reports to more accurately reflect the firm’s relationship and to ensure that they 
comply with the new rules arising from the UAE CG codes. Further, deliberate efforts should 
be invested to establish a follow-up and compliance team to ensure that all firms not only 
comply, but also meet the expectations of the regulatory body, as mandated in the CG code. 
With respect to further areas for research, in 2016, the UAE introduced a third set of CG 
codes. Thus, future studies could undertake a comparative study comparing 2016 to 2017 
with previous years to identify any improvements from the implementation. Further studies 
could also expand the notion of CG beyond board and audit committee characteristics by 
exploring the effects of various other committees, such as remuneration and nomination 
committees. 
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Appendix 1. Study Variables and Their Measures 




Board size (BS) The number of members in the board DFM, ADX, ESCA and firm annual and 
CG reports 
Board independent directors 
(BIND) 
The ratio of independent members to total 
members in the board 
DFM, ADX, ESCA and firm annual and 
CG reports 
Board meetings (BM) The number of board meetings held per year  DFM, ADX, ESCA and firm annual and 
CG reports 
Board members’ education 
(BMED) 
The ratio of directors who hold a degree from 
developed-country universities to total members 
in the board 
DFM, ADX, ESCA and firm annual and 
CG reports 
Board members’ experience 
(BMEX) 
The average number of years of experience of 
board members 






Audit committee size (ACS) The number of members in the committee DFM, ADX, ESCA and firm annual and 
CG reports 
Audit committee independent 
members (ACIND) 
The ratio of independent members to total 
members in the committee 
DFM, ADX, ESCA and firm annual and 
CG reports 
Audit committee meetings 
(ACM) 
The number of committee meetings held per year DFM, ADX, ESCA and firm annual and 
CG reports 
Audit committee members’ 
education (ACED) 
The ratio of number of audit committee members 
holding a degree in a financial discipline to total 
committee members 




Return on Assets (ROA) (Net income) ÷ (average total assets) DFM, ADX, firm annual reports and 
Orbis—Bureau van Dijk and Datastream 
databases 
Return on Equity (ROE) (Net income) ÷ (shareholder’s equity) DFM, ADX, firm annual reports and 




Firm age (FA) The number of years since establishment Firm annual reports, DFM and ADX 
Leverage (LEV) (Total debt) ÷ (shareholders’ equity) Firm annual reports and Orbis—Bureau 
van Dijk and Datastream databases 
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